ABSTRACT. This study examines whether the gender of the directors on fully independent audit committees affects the ability of the committees in constraining earnings management and thus their effectiveness in overseeing the financial reporting process. Using a sample of 525 firm-year observations over the period 2003 to 2005, we are unable to identify an association between the proportion of female directors on audit committees and the extent of earnings management.
Introduction
The audit committee plays a key role in overseeing, monitoring, and advising the management of an organization in implementing internal accounting control systems and preparing financial statements. In their role as overseers of the firm's financial reporting process, members on the audit committee meet on a regular basis with the firm's managers and auditors to review the corporation's financial statements, audit process, and internal accounting controls (Klein, 2002a) . Prior studies have examined whether audit committee characteristics are associated with earnings management. For example, Klein (2002a) finds that a higher proportion of outside directors on an audit committee (i.e. enhancing audit committee independence) is associated with lower earnings management, while Bedard et al. (2004) document that audit committee members' expertise also affects earnings quality.
This study focuses on another facet of audit committee characteristics, namely, the impact of female directorship on the effectiveness of audit committees in constraining earnings management. Using data for years 2001 and 2002 , Gul et al. (2007 find that earnings management is lower if at least one female director sits on the audit committee. Their findings suggest that female audit committee members may be more ethical than males assuming that earnings management is an ethical issue as in Bruns and Merchant (1990) . However, Gul et al. (2007) do not consider many control variables like other audit committee characteristics in their research design, which could have impacted their results. Thus, it is warranted to document further evidence on whether the gender of audit committee members affects earnings management. Furthermore, in contrast to prior research (e.g. Bedard et al., 2004; Gul et al., 2007; Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2008) , we employ the data of independent directors after the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) to examine whether female directors on independent audit committees more effectively constrain earnings management than male directors on independent audit committees. The post-SOX era is the current environment under which audit committees operate. Thus, it is of practical value to investigate audit committees' effectiveness by focusing on audit committees consisting solely of outside directors because U.S. listed firms are currently required to possess independent audit committees. In addition, SOX has greatly expanded the responsibility of the audit committee for oversight of financial reporting.
various additional analyses. However, the results should be cautiously interpreted as they may be affected by several measurement or operationalization issues. Overall, this study contributes to the literature by providing further evidence on whether the gender of audit committee members affects their effectiveness in constraining earnings management and thus their oversight of the financial reporting process. Since there is little research on this topic in the literature, our study sheds more light on this question. This study also contributes to the research on audit committees by focusing on the data in the new corporate governance environment. Unlike prior research (e.g. Bedard et al., 2004; Gul et al., 2007; Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2008) , we employ the data of independent directors after the enactment of the SOX. Finally, our study has implications for regulators and legislators who regulate or legislate the composition of audit committees, and for boards of directors who can modify the composition of audit committees to enhance the monitoring of management's financial reporting process (Beasley and Salterio, 2001 ).
Background and research question
Earnings management has been defined as an intentional alteration of financial information to produce a predetermined result (Gaa and Dunsmore, 2007) . Firms may engage in earnings management for opportunistic purposes. Healy (1985) finds an association between discretionary accruals (attributed to earnings management) and the existence of earningsbased bonus plans, which suggests that management compensation may be an incentive for managers to engage in earnings management. Fudenberg and Tirole (1995) contend that managers have incentives to manage earnings for their job security. Haw et al. (2004) document that earnings management is positively associated with the divergence between control rights and cash-flow rights.
2 Clikeman (2003) lists a variety of situations and pressures which can motivate managers to manipulate their companies' reported earnings, such as meeting market expectations, contractual, and regulatory motives.
Earnings management involves the selection of accounting estimates and the structuring of transactions resulting in biased reported earnings which help the company or its managers achieve their goals at the detriment of the external shareholders or other stakeholders, who are misled about the underlying economic performance of the company. Bruns and Merchant (1990) establish that earnings management is an ethical issue, and Merchant and Rockness (1994) argue that earnings management practices raise the most important ethical issues facing the business profession.
As a part of the corporate governance mechanism, audit committees play a key role in constraining earnings management and enhancing earnings quality. Extant research has documented that audit committee characteristics may affect audit committee effectiveness. For example, Klein (2002a) reports that higher proportion of outside directors on the audit committee is associated with lower earnings management, suggesting that external audit committee members serve an important role in overseeing the firm's financial reporting process and constraining earnings management. Bedard et al. (2004) examine whether audit committee expertise affects earnings management. They measure audit committee expertise with respect to three aspects: financial, governance, and firm-specific expertise. Using a sample of 300 U.S. firms in the year 1996, they find that the financial and governance expertise of audit committee members are negatively associated with the likelihood of aggressive earnings management. They also find that audit committee independence is negatively related to the likelihood of aggressive earnings management.
In addition to individual factors such as independence and expertise, prior literature suggests that other personal attributes including gender difference may affect ethical behaviour. If earnings management decision is an ethical decision, it might also be affected by the gender of the decision makers. Mason and Mudrack (1996) propose two conflicting hypotheses regarding gender differences in ethics: gender socialization which argues that men are expected to respond in ''less ethical'' fashion to ethical situations than women because of the more communal values into which women are socialized, and occupational socialization which hypothesizes that there is gender similarity in employees as a result of occupational socialization. However, prior research shows mixed evidence on whether gender differences affect ethical behaviour.
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